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NOTES 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLICE POWER-Michigan 
Statute Requiring Motorcyclists TQ Wear 
Protective Helmets Held Unconstitutional 
"They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little safety 
deserve neither liberty nor safety." 
-Benjamin Franklin 
"When asked what he would take to let himself receive a blow on 
the head, he said, 'A helmet.' " 
-Diogenes Laertius 
The burgeoning use of motorcycles in the United States1 has 
given rise to a great problem of safety. The fatality rate among 
motorcyclists is substantially higher than the rate for the drivers of 
all other motor vehicles, with head injuries the most frequent cause 
of death.2 In response to this situation, the legislatures of at least 
thirty-four states have passed special laws regarding motorcycle 
safety; of these states, thirty have regulations that require the wear-
ing of helmets.3 These helmet regulations have given rise to a great 
-deal of controversy, and the constitutionality of such statutes has 
been challenged on the ground that they unduly restrict the indi-
vidual cyclist's freedom without benefiting the community. 
A recent Michigan case, American Motorcycle Association v. 
Davids,4 confronted the issue directly. In a proceeding instituted by 
thi> Association, the Michigan court of appeals held unconstitutional 
a sta.t-ute which required a person operating or riding on a motor-
-cycle to -wear a crash heimet of a type approved by the department 
of state police.5 The decision was based primarily on a finding that 
the statute was intended only for the protection of the individual 
motorcyclist-not for the safety and well-being of the general public 
I. CYCLE WoRLD, July 1968, at 50, says that motorcycle registrations in 1967 in• 
creased 43,800 from the previous year. . . 
2. See American Motorcycle Assn. v. Davids, 158 N.W.2d 72, 75 n.9 (1968), where 
the court quotes a Michigan state police report for the period 1962-1966 showing a 
mortality rate of 10.6 for 10,000 registrations of motorcycles, as compared with 5.2 
per 10,000 for all vehicles in the same period. 
3. CYCLE WORLD, July 1968, at 50. Among the states which have laws requiring 
helmets are: Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indfana, Kansas, 
Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, South 1)akota, Tennessee, and Texas. These helmet requirements 
appear to have been effective, for despite increased cycle use, motorcycle deaths in 1967 
in the thirty states that had such requirements decreased as much as 50% (in New 
York), while California, which leads the nation in motorcycle registrations but has no 
protective helmet law, saw a 9% increase in motorcycle fatalities. 
4. 158 N.W.2d 72 (1968). 
5. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2358(d) (Cum. Supp. 1968), amending MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 257 .658(d) (1948). 
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-and that it thus went beyond the permissible scope of the state's 
police power. 
The Michigan decision is representative of the initial reaction 
by various courts to such statutes. In early 1967, two New York cases 
held that the New York law requiring the wearing of helmets6 was 
unconstitutional. In People v. Smallwood,7 a local levef trial court 
held that such a statute takes from the individual his right to exer-
cise his judgment in the use of personal adornment, a right which, 
according to the court, cannot be waived. In People v. Carmichael,8 
another local court defined the police power of the state as the power 
to regulate the conduct of one person so that his actions do not 
unreasonably restrict the rights of or endanger others. Concluding 
that a helmetless driver or rider would not endanger the safety of 
others, the court found in the New York statute an attempt to en-
large the state's police power beyond federal constitutional bounds, 
In Everhardt v. City of New Orleans9 the Louisiana court of appeals 
held unconstitutional a city ordinance requiring helmets to be worn 
by all motorcyclists; this court found that the requirement was a 
denial of due process and equal protection. 
The majority trend, however, has been to hold helmet statutes 
constitutional. The New York courts appear to have changed their 
view, and three recent local court cases-People v. Bielmeyer,10 
People v. Schmidt,11 and People v. Newhouse12-have held that the 
state has the right to regulate how riders and passengers of vehicles 
susceptible to special dangers should protect themselves on public 
property. In February of 1968, an intermediate appellate court in 
New York reversed the Carmichael decision, holding that the hel-
met requirement is valid because it furthers the state's interest in 
maintaining a strong and viable citizenry by keeping the cyclists 
safe.13 In State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi,14 the Supreme Court of 
Rhode Island denied .4efendant cyclist's motion to dismiss on the 
grounds of unconstitutionality of the helmet statute and found that 
the law bears a reasonable relationship to highway _safety and thus 
does not constitute an improper exercise of police power. In the 
most recent reported decision, Commonwealth v. Howie,15 the Su-
preme Judicial Court of :Massachusetts followed Lombardi and 
upheld the validity of a helmet statute. 
6. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 381(6) (McKinney Supp. 1966). 
7. 52 Misc. 2d 1027, 277 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Town Ct. of Irandequoit 1967). 
8. 53 Misc. 2d 584, 279 N.Y.S.2d 272 (Town Ct. of Oakfield 1967). 
9. 208 S.2d 423 (1968). 
10. 54 Misc. 2d 466, 282 N.Y .S.2d 797 (City Ct. of Buffalo 1967). 
11. 54 Misc. 2d 702, 283 N.Y.S.2d 290 (County Ct. of Erie County 1967). 
12. 55 Misc. 2d 1064, 287 N.Y.S.2d 713 (City Ct. of Ithaca 1968). 
13. 56 Misc. 2d 388, 288 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Genesee County Ct. 1968). 
14. 241 A.2d 625 (1968). 
15. 238 N.E.2d 373 (1968). 
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It is settled constitutional doctrine that a state's police power 
can be properly exercised only when there is a reasonable relation-
ship to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare.16 Accordingly, 
in 1905 the United States Supreme Court upheld a law requiring 
all people to be vaccinated because the law was related not only to 
the health of the individual, but also to the protection of the public 
against the spread of disease.17 Conversely, if the courts can find no 
relationship between the statute in question and the public health, 
safety, morals, or welfare, the statute is unconstitutional.18 Thus, the 
Supreme Court has held invalid a statute requiring every parent or 
guardian of a child between the ages of eight and sixteen to send 
that child to a public school in the district where he resided since 
it did not promote the health, safety, peace, morals, education, or 
general welfare of the people and therefore was an unreasonable 
interference with the liberty of parents and guardians in raising their 
children.19 The basis for this and similar decisions is the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment: if there is no benefit flowing 
to the public from the enforcement of a statute which restricts indi-
vidual freedom, there is a denial of liberty without due process of 
law.20 
16. E.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Van Oster v. Kansas, 
272 U.S. 465 (1926); Pacific Gas Co. v. Police Ct., 251 U.S. 22 (1919)~ 
It can be argued that the statute prohibiting a cyclist from riding helmetless is 
similar to statutes in many states which make it a crime to attempt suicide. These 
suicide statutes protect an individual from himself, generally without affecting the •• 
public welfare in any way except by maintaining a viable citizenry. The suicide situa-
tion, however, can be distinguished, for the shocking nature of the act and the long 
tracin-ron of its criminality make it different from the new and indirect helmet regula-
'tions. To 'jn'Ohibit people from killing themselves directly is one thing, but to prohibit 
them-from riskfag their lives indirectly is quite another. 
17. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). Similarly, before the passage of 
the eighteenth amendment, the Court found that a state prohibition--0n the manufac-
ture and sale of intoxicating liquors did not deprive the citizen of his constitutional 
freedom because the law protected the public against the harmful conduct of one 
whose behavior toward others is affected by the use of alcohol. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 
U.S. 623 (1887). 
18. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), in which a divided Court 
invalidated a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives, even by married 
couples. 
19. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390 (1923). 
20. See Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. I (1927); Atkin v. Kansas, 
191 U.S. 207 (1903); Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890); Mugler Y. Kansas, 123 
U.S. 623 (1887). 
The :\lichigan court of appeals offered another basis, purportedly independent of 
the due process argument, for holding the helmet statute unconstitutional: the maxim 
of John Stuart Mill that "the individual is not accountable to society for his actions, 
insofar as these concern the interests of no person but himself." J. MILL, UTILITARIAN• 
ISM, LIBERTY AND REPRESENTATIVE GoVERNMENT 201 (A. Lindsay ed. 1950). The Michigan 
court cited four decisions which it clained were based upon this philosophy. These cita• 
tions include Smallwood and the first Carmichael decision, neither of which mentioned 
the maxim and both of which suggested its content as only one of a number of arguments 
on which the respective courts based their decisions. See text accompaming notes 7 &, R 
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Such a conclusion rests on a substantive interpretation of the 
fourteenth amendment's due process clause: that the rights protected 
hy that clause from interference by the states include rights not 
specifically enumerated in the first eight amendments. It is uncer-
tain, however, due to the many conflicting opinions in Griswold v. 
Connecticut,21 whether the Supreme Court still follows such an 
interpretation so far as the fourteenth amendment is concerned.22 
Nevertheless, according to one scholar, Griswold is 
supra. The Michigan court also cited an opinion by the attorney general of New 
Mexico which did not mention the ma.xim, though it did employ :\fill's philosophy. 
See N. MEX. OP. A:ITY. GEN. No. 66-15, at 19 (1966). The question immediately arises 
whether Mill's maxim is, in fact, incorporated in the Federal Constitution. The 
Supreme Court has considered the due process clause to permit the state to restrain 
an individual's actions only to further the common welfare, and, conversely, to guar-
antee a citizen the right to act as he pleases so long as his actions do not adversely 
affect others. E.g., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer "· Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Cf. Ex parte 
Drexel, 147 Ca!. 763, 82 P. 429 (1905). But see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 
(1905) (dissent of Justice Holmes). In this view, the due process limitation on police 
power is simply an embodiment of Mill's premise. To quote his maxim is only to state 
the reasonable-relationship test in the converse; thus Mill's maxim was not really an 
independent ground for the court's decision. 
21. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See note 18 supra. Another basis for holding the helmet 
laws unconstitutional, unrelated to the due process clause, was advanced by the 
Louisiana court in Et,erhardt when it concluded that the ordinance in question denied 
equal protection of the laws to motorcyclists by imposing undue and unnecessary 
restrictions upon one limited class of the motoring public. 208 S.2d at 426. The Con-
stitution, however, requires only that the classification be reasonable and be based 
upon substantial differences having a reasonable relationship both to the objects or 
persons dealt with and to the public purpose sought to be achieved by the legislation 
involved. E.g., Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231 (1954); Old Dearborn Distrib. 
Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936); International Harvester Co. v. 
'.\lissouri, 234 U.S. 199 (1914). Even assuming that the ordinance has no relation to the 
~afcty of others, the classification itself would nonetheless be reasonable because the 
,listinclion~ between cyclists and other motorists are clear and substantial, and be-
cause it is those very differences that suggest the need for special legislation to protect 
the former which would be unreasonable if imposed on others. Whether the purpose 
of the helmet restriction rela•tes to the public or the individual, and is valid or invalid, 
that purpose relates directly to the unique situation of a motorcyclist, and thus the 
regulation is not an unreasonable classification violative of the equal protection 
clause. 
22. It is interesting to note that the }Iichigan court of appeals relied in part on 
Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold-an opinion which invoked the 
ninth amendment in support of the fundamental rights theory. The ninth amend-
ment, said Justice Goldberg, is an acknowledgement that liberty is not restricted to 
the freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights, but that there are inherent rights 
which exist independently of the explicit wording of the first eight amendments. As 
applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment, the ninth amendment shows 
that it was the intent of the original authors of the Bill of Rights that fundamental 
personal rights cannot be violated by tht. state merely because they were not enu-
merated in the fir;t eight amendments. 38, U.S. at 486-99. Since the effect of Justice 
Goldberg's ninth-amendment argument is additional support for the fundamental-
rights theory rather than a substitute for it, the Michigan court's reliance upon it 
adds nothing new to the basic analysis of the problem. See P. Kauper, Penumbras, 
Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental, and Things Forgotten: The Griswold 
Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 235, 254 (1965). 
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a reaffirmation by a majority of the Court of the fundamental [or 
substantive] rights theory-both in the sense that only fundamental 
rights derived from the Bill of Rights are incorporated into the 
fourteenth amendment and in the sense that the due process clause 
is a source of rights apart from the specifics of the Bill of Rights.28 
Thus, assuming that this interpretation is correct, the fundamental 
question is whether the helmet statutes bear a reasonable relation-
ship to the public welfare. 
The courts which have declared helmet statutes invalid have 
been unable to find a sufficient relationship between the helmet 
requirement and the welfare of the community at large. As indi-
cated earlier, the Michigan court saw the statute in question only 
as a protection of the cyclist from severe head injuries; the court felt 
that any other interpretation was "a strained effort to justify what 
is admittedly wholesome legislation."24 The Louisiana court de-
clared that "[t]he only function of the helmet requirement :we are 
able to discern is to minimize the extent of injury to the individual 
cyclist involved in an accident, and not to contribute to the safety 
of the motoring public at large."25 On the other hand, those courts 
which have upheld the helmet laws advance various arguments to 
support the necessary relationship to the public welfare. The justi-
fication recently offered by the New York courts was the state's in-
terest in a viable citizenry. According to this argument, the state can 
prevent its citizens from pursuing a course of conduct that could 
cause their dependents or themselves to become public charges.26 
Moreover, it is argued that "[i]t is to the interest of the state to have 
23. Id. at 249-50. Professor Kauper adds that the Griswold case 
is not inconsistent with cases that have reduced economic liberty to a minimum 
of judicial protection. Freedom of the legislature to determine economic policy 
in the public interest is much greater than its freedom to determine social policy 
by means that intrude on personal liberty and essentially private conduct. In the 
case of restrictions on economic liberty, a simple rationality test applies, but 
when the legislature impinges upon fundamental non-economic liberties of an 
essentially personal character, as in Griswold, a more exacting judical test is 
applied. 
The Court apparently sees a hierarchy of values protected by the Constitution and 
recognizes that the degree of judicial scrutiny and protection varies in direct propor-
tion to the importance of the right. Thus, assuming that the majority does follow the 
substantive interpretation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the 
right infringed in any given case would have to be important enough to be ranked as 
"fundamental" in order to be protected by that clause against state regulation. The 
right abridged by the helmet laws is the freedom to wear whatever one chooses so 
long as that action affects no one but the individual himself; whether that right is 
fundamental enough to be a substantive due process right has of course never been 
discussed by the Supreme Court. See note 40 infra. 
24. 158 N.W.2d at 75. The court adds: "This statute has a relationship to the pro-
tection of the individual motorcyclist from himself, but not to the public health, 
safety and welfare." 158 N.W.2d at 76. 
25. 208 S.2d 423, 426 (1968). 
26. See People v. Carmichael, 288 N.Y.S.2d 931, 935 (1968). See also State ex rel. 
Colvin v. Lombardi, 241 A.2d 625, 627 (Sup. Ct. Rl. 1968). 
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strong, robust, healthy citizens capable of bearing arms, of self-sup-
port, and of adding to the resources of the country,"27 and that, as 
· ong as the means are reasonable, the legislature can protect indi-
-,iduals from themselves to further that interest. Thus, the helmet 
·egulations promote the public welfare not only by tending to pre• 
rent cyclists from becoming wards of the state because of disabling 
1ead injuries, but also by tending to keep members of the commu-
1ity healthy and productive.28 
The Michigan court specifically rejected the "public charges'· 
·rgument, stating that it could lead to unlimited paternalism.21 
)nee it can be said that protecting an individual from himself bears 
:. reasonable relationship to public welfare, the argument runs, there 
s nothing to prevent the state from requiring all motorists to wear 
:rash helmets, from forbidding smoking, or from requiring everyone 
:o go to bed at 10:00 p.m. Such laws would be conducive to healthie1 
:itizens and thus to a "viable citizenry.''30 It is significa:nt that the 
:::ourts which upheld the helmet statutes on the basis of the public 
:nterest in a viable citizenry cited no authority to support tfteb 
1rgument. Surely the Michigan court was correct in stating that the 
'public charges" argument proves too much, since such reasoninf 
,\'ould give the legislature the power to regulate almost every aspec0 
Jf individual conduct in a society "so complex that there are ver-
Iew things that cannot be said to affect some other person or th{ 
,:mblic treasury."31 The limitations on the police power would dir 
1ppear if the states were permitted to regulate individual conduc 
,)n the basis of the attenuated "public charge" rationale. 
27. 288 N.Y.S.2d at 935. 
28. It was argued by the state in the Michigan case that the helmet statute couk 
1lso be justified under the doctrine of parens patriae, the specific relationship of th 
;tate to youth. This is the power of the state that justifies laws such as those makinr 
it illegal for minors to smoke. The ~fichigan court correctly rejected this contentior 
because the application of t.l!e.helmet statute was not limited to youth. 158 N.W.2d ~l 
75. 
29. 158 N.W.2d at 75. It is consistent with Michigan's view of the general welfaxe 
that suicide is not a statutory crime in Michigan. 
30. 158 N.W. at 76. People ,·. Carmichael, 53 Misc. 2d 584, 588-89, 279 N.Y.S.2·1 
272, 277 (1967). A possible answer to this objection is that even if the courts would 
otherwise uphold such regulation of individual conduct in the interest of viab e 
:itizenry, they will not do so because of a reasonableness test which applies in cases of 
1lis sort. This test balances the state's interest against the individual's. A helmt t 
requirement is found to be re3.50nable because it is only a slight infringement on th~ 
·ndividual's freedom as he tra,els on a public highway, but an extreme law-for 
.::xample, a requirement that a cyclist wear a suit of armor, a prohibition of smoking. 
or a requirement that people to go to bed at 10:00 p.m.-would be unreasonable. 
and therefore unconstitutional, because it would infringe too greatly on persona' 
liberty. 
The reasonableness test, however, is unsatisfactory because the fact that a court can 
use it to limit grossly infringing regulations does not make up for the inability of 
that test to deal with infringements which are "reasonable" because relatively mod-
erate, but nonetheless repugnant to ordinary concepts of personal liberty. 
,1 PPnnle v. C-i.rmichael, 53 Mix. 2d 584,589, 279 N.Y,S.2cl 97?, '>.'77, 
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A second justification offered to demonstrate a reasonable rela-
tionship between helmet laws and the public welfare is that the 
crash helmet may prevent certain types of accidents-specifically 
situations in which the cyclist could be propelled off the road or into 
the opposing lane, causing damage to other vehicles or property, or 
injuries to other motorists or pedestrians. For example, loose stones 
kicked up by passing vehicles, or other flying objects-against which 
the driver of an automobile has some protection-could strike the 
helmetless motorcyclist in the head, causing him to lose control of 
his vehicle.32 One answer to this argument was given by the Michi-
gan court: 
If the purpose [of the helmet regulations] truly were to deflect flying 
objc.::ts, rather than to reduce cranial injuries, a windshield require-
ment imposed on the manufacturer would bear a [more] reasonable 
relationship to the objective and not vary from the norm of safety 
legislation customarily imposed on the manufacturer for the pro-
tection of the public rather than upon the individual.33 
But the court's answer is specious because it is not the function of 
the judiciary to decide whether the means adopted by the legislature 
are the best means possible to attain the end sought.34 Except when 
the regulations chosen are in themselves unconstitutional, courts 
should defer to the legislative selection of methods. Thus, even if a 
windshield regulation would provide more effective protection for 
public safety, the helmet requirement is still constitutional as long 
as it tends in some degree to protect public safety. But while the 
legislature need not choose the best means to an end, it is clear that 
it cannot choose a method that violates the fundamental liberties 
oi an individual if the end can be achieved without infringement 
of those liberties.35 The Supreme Court stated this directly in 
32. People v. Bielmeyer, 54 Misc. 2d 466, 469, 282 N.Y.S.2d 797, 800 (1967): 
Cyclists generally keep to the right of the road where stones and gravel are found 
which could be propelled by the delicately balanced wheels into the head of the 
cyclist or passenger, causing distraction and loss of control. 
Far more than with an automobile or a truck the very nature of a mortorcycle 
requires that a rider be able to control his vehicle at every second •••. [This] 
means that the rider must always wear the recommended clothing and equipment 
for his protection as well as the protection of others. 
33. 158 N.W.2d at 75. 
34. McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 547 (1909): 
The legislature being familiar with local conditions is primarily the judge of the 
necessity of such enactments. The mere fact that the court may differ with the 
legislature in its views of public policy or that judges may hold views inconsistent 
with the· propriety of legislation in question affords no ground for judicial inter-
ference .••. 
See also Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936); 
Standard Oil Co. v. City of Marysville, 279 U.S. 582 (1929); St. Louis Southwestern Ry. 
v. Board of Directors of Miller Levee Dist. No. 2, 207 F. 338 (8th Cir. 1913). 
35. This principle is supported by the general rule, stated in People v. Armstrong, 
73 Mich. 288, 41 N.W. 275 (1889), that the state can impose restraints on the indi-
vidual only to that extent which is required or necessary for the protection of public 
health, safety, or welfare. This seems to imply that if a statutory restriction is not 
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Schneider v. State,30 in which it invalidated an ordinance which 
banned all distribution of handbills on public streets. Although the 
ordinance's purpose-to keep the streets clean and neat-was legiti-
mate, it was insufficient to justify an abridgement of the individual's 
right of free speech. There were other reasonable methods available 
to prevent littering which did not interfere with personal freedom-
for example, punishment of those who actually throw papers on the 
streets. Similarly, in both Shelton v. Tucker31 and Dean Milk Co. 
v. City of Madison,38 the Supreme Court held laws which limited 
personal freedom unconstitutional because there were adequate non-
infringing means to achieve the same end.39 Thus, it might be 
argued that if the end which justifies the helmet requirement is the 
protection of the public from cyclists careening out of control be-
cause of a blow on the head by a flying object, that requirement 
should be invalid because a regulation on the manufacturer to install 
a windshield would accomplish the same goal ·without any infringe-
ment of personal liberty. 
This argument, however, raises several problems. Unlike the 
rights that were restricted in Schneider and similar cases, the right 
to wear what one wishes on a public street, allegedly infringed by 
the helmet laws, is not a strong or well-established one.4° Further-
more, the effectiveness of the noninfringing alternative here fr 
uncertain-it is not clear that a windshield will do the same job a:. 
necessary or essential-that is, if there is another method to the same end that doe, 
not infriI,ge on individual liberty-the restriction is invalid. 
36. 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
37. 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
38. 340 U.S. 349 (1950). 
39. The Court in Shelton held unconstitutional an Arkansas statute requiring every 
tt:acher, as a condition of employment, to file an annual af!ida,it listing every organiu • 
tion to which he had belonged or regularly contributed within the preceding five 
years. 
There can be no doubt of• ilie right of a state to investigate the competency of 
those whom it hires to teach in its schools •.•. [butJ even though the govern-
mental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued 
by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be 
more narrowly achieved. 
364 U.S. at 485, 488. In Dean Milk Company, an ordinance forbidding the sale of milL 
in a city under a "pasteurized" label unless the milk had been pasteurized and bottled 
at an approved plant within five miles of the city was declared unconstitutional. The 
Court made it clear that "even in the exercise of its unquestioned power to protect 
the health and safety of its people, [a municipality may not erect an economic barrie1 
against competition] if reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to con-
serve legitimate local interest, are available." 390 U.S. at 354. 
40. The rights abridged in Schneider, Shelton, and Dean Milk Co. were the right 
of free speech, the right of free association, and the guarantee of equal protection of 
the laws, respectively. All of these are liberties deeply rooted in the traditions of the 
United States, guaranteed from the beginnings of its history, and upheld time and 
time again by its courts. Although there are isolated cases in which courts have held 
that an individual has the right to choose his own attire [People v. O'Gorman, 274 
N.Y. 284, 8 N.E.2d 862 (1937)], that right has certainly been recognized much less 
Frrnnpntlu 
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a helmet in protecting the cyclist's head. Thus, it is difficult to see 
how the existence of an alternative and less restrictive method would 
by itself in these circumstances render the helmet requirement 
unconstitutional. The ultimate question then is not whether there 
is an alternative noninfringing method to the end. Rather, since the 
opposing courts agree that some form of reasonable-relationship test 
is proper,41 the determinative question should be simply whether 
flying objects do, in fact, constitute such a danger to helmetless 
motorcyclists that those cyclists could adversely affect the safety of 
the general public. 
The evidence which has arisen in response to this question is 
Delphic. The New York, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts courts, 
asserting that the danger is real, support their conclusion with such 
general statements as "one hears or reads about instances where 
cyclists have been hit with hard-shelled beetles or bees and have lost 
control of their bikes, causing damage and injuries to others."42 
Accepting these statements, it might seem that the helmet regula-
tions can be justified by the protection they afford to the general 
public even though their original purpose was the protection of 
individual cyclists.43 But the courts which have claimed that the 
danger of flying objects is genuine cite no cases or studies and offer 
no specific evidence to support their conclusion.44 Moreover, the 
legislatures which have enacted helmet statutes make no mention of 
any studies or reports which show that flying objects present such a 
danger to cyclists as to cause accidents. A New York legislative 
memorandum did cite an extensive study showing that most motor-
cycle fatalities could have been avoided by wearing the proper 
helmet,45 but neither the memorandum nor the study said anything 
41. The courts do not differ in their determination of the proper test to apply here, 
but differ rather in their view of the intent and effect of the helmet statute. Whereas 
the Michigan and Louisiana courts saw the law as affecting only individual safety, the 
New York, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts courts saw a reasonable relationship 
between it and the safety of others. Thus, all the courts agree that an individual is 
master of his fate so long as his actions concern only himself, but disagree as to 
whether the action of a cyclist in not wearing a helmet could directly affect the welfare 
of others. 
42. People v. Bielmeyer, 54 Misc. 2d 466, 469, 282 N.Y.S.2d 797, 800 (1967). See also 
note 32 supra; State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi, 241 A.2d, 625, 627 (R.I. 1968). 
It is also interesting that in a telephone interview, the Ann Arbor, Michigan, 
police stated that it is very likely that flying objects could cause a motorcyclist to lose 
control of his machine. However, they were unable to cite specific statistics or to recall 
any concrete instances in which a flying object had actually been the cause of a 
motorcycle accident. 
43. See note 45 infra. 
44. This is, of course, not conclusive proof that such dangers do not exist. It may 
indicate only that there have been no studies or reports on this subject; and, indeed, 
exhaustive research has revealed no such studies. 
45. See N.Y. SESSION LAws 2961 (McKinney 1966) (citing the results of that study): 
The number of accidents involving motorcycles is increasing rapidly. In fact, 
motorcycle accidents increased by 105% in 1965 as compared to 1964 ...• Fatalities 
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about protecting people other than the cyclist himself. Indeed, 
although there is substantial evidence that helmets have prevented 
individual cyclists from being injured in accidents,46 none could be 
found to show that the use of helmets had ever prevented the occur-
rence of an accident, or even to show that accidents had been caused 
by flying objects hitting a helmetless rider in the head. It is an un-
satisfactory resolution of the fundamental issue merely to take judi-
cial notice of what "one hears or reads about"47 when there is as yet 
no evidence to support that contention and when several courts have 
disputed existence of the "fact" which is being judicially noticed. 
It is unclear whether the state must come forward with any evi-
dence of a reasonable relationship between a police power regula-
tion and the public welfare in order to resist a challenge to the law's 
constitutionality. It may be that the cha11€nger is required to prove 
that there is in fact no reasonable relationship to public welfare. 
Support for this approach to the burden-of-proof problem raised in 
these cases might be found in the presumption of constitutionality 
that attaches to all legislative enactments.48 In O'Gorman & Young, 
Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., the Supreme Court stated: 
As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality 
of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality 
must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record 
for overthrowing the statute .... The action of the legislature . . . 
indicates that such evils did exist [for which this statutory provision 
was an appropriate remedy].49 
increased by 63.6% and personal injury accidents by 100%. A summary of the 
Department statistics indicates that 89.2% of the motorcycle accidents result in 
injury or death and that almost all fatalities occurring as a result of such acci-
dents involved head injuries. Most of these fatalities could have been avoided, or 
the severity lessened, by the use of a proper helmet. 
The helmet requirement, continues the memorandum, "should go far in protecting the 
drivers and passengers on mot-0rcycles." Id. (emphasis added). 
46. See notes 3 and 45 supra. 
47. See, e.g., text accompanying note 42 supra. 
48. Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144 (1944); Toombs v. Citizens Bank, 
281 U.S. 643 (1930); Home Tel. &: Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265 (1908). 
49. 282 U.S. 251, 257-58 (1931). In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 
379 U.S. 241 (1964) and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), the Court held 
that Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 preventing racial discrimination in public 
accomodations was a valid exercise of congressional power under the commerce clause as 
long as Congress had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination by those estab-
lishments affected interstate commerce. By analogy, it can be argued in the helmet 
cases that, since the legislature has passed the law, it has determined that there is a 
reasonable relationship between it and the public welfare and that that determination 
cannot be overturned in the absence of a showing by complainant that no such reason-
able relationship exists. 
However, the Heart of Atlanta and lllcClung cases are inapposite here because 
they dealt v.ith the congressional power over commerce-a broad, enumerated power 
of Congress-rather than with the police power. Moreover, in those cases t~ere were 
congressional hearings about the effect of the prohibited activity upon interstate com-
merc-2: "[T]he record of [the Act's) pa.."3age through each house," says the Court in 
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If the law is that the state has no burden to offer any evidence to 
.support its contentions, the Michigan court's decision in Davids 
would appear to be incorrect since the defendant did not disprove 
that a reasonable relationship existed between the regulation and 
the public welfare.50 However, such an interpretation of the law 
relating to the burden of proof requires the challenger, in effect, to 
offer evidence that there is no evidence of a reasonable relation-
ship.51 How is one to prove lack of evidence other than by merely 
stating that fact and by challenging the opposition to offer some 
evidence to controvert it? To require the challenger to prove a 
negative fact seems unreasonable. It appears more sensible-at least 
in cases where the challenger asserts in his pleadings that there is no 
evidence to demonstrate a reasonable relationship between the 
statute and the public welfare-to place the initial burden of going 
forward with the evidence upon the state. Once the state has offered 
any substantial evidence to support the statute,52 the burden would 
immediately shift to the challenger and it would be up to him to 
disprove that evidence. The meaning here of "substantial evidence" 
is the one advanced by the Supreme Court as the standard for judi-
cial review of administrative action: 
Evidence which is substantial, that is, affording a substantial basis of 
fact from which the £act in issue can be reasonably inferred .... It 
must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to 
direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is 
one of fact for the jury.5s 
Heart of Atlanta, "is replete with evidence of the burdens that discrimination by race 
or color places upon interstate commerce." 379 U.S. at 252. See also Katzenbach v. 
McClung, supra, at 304: "[F]or the evidence presented at the hearings fully indicated 
the nature and effect of the burden on commerce which Congress meant to alleviate." 
But in the helmet situation there is no evidence that the legislatures ever gave any 
thought to the effect of the statutes on the safety of others. Indeed, there is evidence 
to the contrary; see note 45 supra. 
50. The Michigan court's opinion is devoid of any reference to evidence which 
tended to demonstrate factually and conclusively that helmets did not prevent acci• 
dents or that flying objects did not cause them. 
51. Statistics are seldom compiled on events that do not happen or accidents that 
do not occur. It would be far easier for the state to offer evidence that such accidents 
caused by flying objects do, in fact, occur. 
52. To allow the state to meet its burden of going forward with the evidence by 
offering merely a "scintilla" of evidence to support a reasonable relationship does not 
solve the problem. For example, the state could present one isolated incident in which 
a flying object striking a helmetless cyclist had caused an accident, and the challenger 
would still have the burden of proving that that incident was the only one of its 
kind. Thus, requiring the state to offer some substantial evidence would appear to be a 
better proposal. · 
53. NLRB v. 'Columbian Enameling and Stamping Co., !106 U.S. 292, !100 (19!19). 
According to the Court in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), this 
delinitioo continues as the authoritative guide to the ID\:aning of "substantial evi-
dence.'' 
Under the substantial evidence test, a statute cannot be striken down unless the 
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This proposal is generally consistent with the presumption of con-
stitutionality since the ultimate burden of proof will usually remain 
upon the challenger. Under the proposal suggested in this Note, 
which would put the initial burden of going forward with the evi-
dence upon the state, the Michigan court would appear to have 
decided correctly since the state failed to offer any evidence to 
support a reasonable relationship between the helmet statute and 
the public welfare/'4 
court has a firm conviction that it is unreasonable. Thus, such a test would result in 
upholding more state regulations than if the state judged the statutes on a "clearly 
..!rroneous" basis. The Supreme Court has stated that "a finding [or a statute] is 'clearly 
erroneous' when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the 
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm com,iction that a mistake has been 
:ommitted." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) (em-
1:hasis added). A firm-conviction-of-mistake test is closer to a substitution of judicial 
)r legislative judgment than is a firm-conviction-of-unreasonableness test, which is 
·,ecessary to upset a finding or a statute under the substantial-evidence test; conse-
1uently it is more difficult to invalidate a statute under the substantial-evidence test 
llan under the clearly-erroneous test. When applied to helmet laws which are chal-
•cnged as unreasonable, the proposal suggested in the text would require the state to 
,)me fon\'ard with enough eviden-.c to meet the substantial-evidence test and thus to 
rercome the contention of unreasonableness. But as long as the statute is not un-
:asonable, that is, as long as there is enough evidence in its favor to justify a refusal 
: "direct a verdict" against it, then the challenger still has the burden of going 
:rward even if the claim of a reasonable relationship is seen by the court as "clearly 
croneous." 
54. None of the courts which have dealt with the issue has gone to the basic 
,ctual and evidentiary question regarding the actual existence of a reasonable rela-
)nship or to the even more fundamental question concerning who has the initial 
,nden of offering evidence. Instead, the courts have become involved in a balancing 
.·ocess between the interests of the individual and those of the state. To the courts 
riking do'l'.'Il the helmet laws, the state's interest is too remote to be given weight. 
o the courts upholding the laws, however, the individual cyclist's interest is small, 
,r wearing a helmet would hardly seem to be an oppressive burden, while the interest 
,2 the state in public highways and highway safety is great enough to justify regula-
on of even the most attenuated threat. People v. Bielmeyer, 54 Misc. 2d 466, 468-69, 
:32 N.Y.S.2d 797, 800 (1967) ("It has long been recognized that the power to regulate 
11d control the use of public roads and highways is primarily the exclusive preroga-
, _\'C of the state~:1. Furthermore the right to wear what one wishes on a public street 
, 1ay not be considered fundamental enough to be protected by the fourteenth amend-
1,ient even under the substantive-rights interpretation of the due process clause. See 
,otes 23 and 40 supra. Thm, because helmet laws are merely a minor abridgement of 
ndividual liberty and because the right on which they impinge has not been definitely 
·ecognized as a fundamental one, these courts have been willing to grope to find a 
·elationship between the regulations in question and the public welfare. Despite 
J3enjamin Franklin's admonitions against those who would put safety over freedom, 
.hese courts seem willing to resolve all doubts in favor of the state without demanding 
:ny concrete evidence that unhelmeted cyclists are likely to hann others or even 
considering the burden of proof question at the crux of this entire controversy. 
Yet the argument for constitutionality, if convincing at all, would appear to be 
persuasive only in rega1<l to the operator of the cycle. The relationship between the 
requirement that a passenger on a cycle wear a helmet and the safety of others ap-
pears to be more attenuated. That requirement is supported in the case authority 
.:mly by a statement in Bielmeyer that "passengers are just as susceptible to injuries as 
operators and a head injury to a passenger could sufficiently distract a driver to create 
a danger to other users of the highway.'' 54 Misc. 2d at 469-70, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 801. 
While such an event is conceivable, to view it as likely requires great imagination, 
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The ramifications of the helmet cases are for the most part yet 
unknown .. Jn Michigan, one immediate effect of the Davids decision 
was the passage of a new statute by the Michigan legislature.55 This 
statute requires that all motorcycles carry, when in operation, a 
number of crash helmets equal to the number of persons riding on 
the bike. Such a regulation is even more unlikely to promote public 
safety than the previous requirement, since merely having a helmet 
on the motorcycle in no way prevents the cyclist from being distracted 
or hurt. It is difficult to see what purpose this requirement serves 
other than encouraging the cyclist to wear a helmet; it is very awk-
ward for him to carry it.56 The new law appears to be merely an 
attempt to circumvent the court's ruling. Since the Supreme Court 
has indicated that indirect means to achieve unconstitutional ends 
are just as objectionable as the most direct form of regulation, 57 the 
new Michigan statute should also be declared unconstitutional. 
The Michigan decision in the instant case may have an effect on 
the somewhat analogous problems connected with seat belt regula-
tions. The Michigan courts, if they follow Davids, could not uphol6. 
a legislative requirement that all motorists wear safety belts. 58 Such 
a regulation would bear even less relation to the safety and welfare 
of others than the helmet laws do,59 for it is inconceivable that the 
failure to wear a seat belt could cause an accident, 60 or even pose the 
threat of one. 
since the passenger is shielded by the operator from most flying objects and since he 
is not in control of the cycle. If there is no evidence to show that flying objects 
striking the operator actually cause accidents, it is unlikely that there is any to 
support an even more remote possibility. Even for a court searching for reasons to 
justify the law, such a highly unlikely argument as that usecl in Bielmeyer should 
probably be -outweighed by the passenger's right to indivitlual freedom. 
55. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2358(d) (1968). 
56. The statute was evidently passed with the feeling that the new regulation was 
similar to the ones requiring seat belts to be installed in cars and, as such, should be 
allowed. However, the seat belt requirements are imposed upon the manufacturer and 
do not regulate individual conduct; in this case, the individual cyclist must buy and 
carry a helmet. 
57. See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965). 
58. It is significant that at the present time no state has such a law on the books. 
59. Even the New York courts, which have allowed a reasonable regulation of 
individual safety in the interest of a productive community, would probably find such 
a law unreasonable on the grounds .that it is too great an infringement upon personal 
freedom. See note 30 supra. According to the court in Miller v. Miller, 160 S.E.2d 65, 
69 (N.C. 1968), the scant use which the average reasonably prudent motorist makes of 
seat belts indicates that such a regulation would be too great an infringement. On 
the other hand, even where there is no requirement, most motorcyclists wear helmets 
in the interests of personal safety. Thus, helmet laws might be reasonable where seat 
belt laws-would not. 
60. Yet some states require seat belts for registration of a car manufactured after a 
certain year. See CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 27309 (Supp. 1967); GA. CODE ANN. § 68-1801 
(Supp. 1966); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 7 (1967); MICH. REv_. STAT. § 9.2410(2) (Supp. 
1965); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 39-7, 123.05 (Supp. 1967): N.J. REv. STAT. § 39.3-76.2 (Supp. 
1967); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 383(a) (McKinney Supp. 1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 20-135.2 (1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 12-413 (Supp. 1967); ORE. REv. STAT. 
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The effects of the helmet decisions on the law in general may be 
substantial. On the one hand, if a helmet statute is held constitu-
tional, inroads could be made upon personal liberty; the legislature 
might rely on similar strained and unproved relationships to the 
general welfare in order to justify regulations impinging upon other 
areas of individual conduct.61 On the other hand, to hold such a 
statute unconstitutional may require the judiciary to interfere un-
reasonably with the legislature's conception of public welfare. In 
light of these considerations, courts dealing with challenges to such 
regulations in the future should pay closer attention to the difficult 
factual questions underlying the reasonable relationship test; they 
must also attempt to answer the basic questions surrounding the 
burden of proof and the burden of going fonvard with the evidence 
in these cases. 
§. 483.482 (1965); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 31-23-39 (Supp. 1966). In the case of such a 
regulation, just as in the helmet situation, the burden of installation is on the indi-
vidual owner and he himself is regulated for his own protection. Thus, Michigan 
courts would probably not uphold such a law, for the requirement that the individual 
have belts in his car bears less relation to public welfare than a requirement of wear• 
ing them, and much less relation than a helmet requirement. This is analogous to the 
present Michigan law that helmets be carried on cycles-a law which cannot be recon• 
ciled with the Davids decision, unless by the argument that the owner is thereby 
making seat belts available to anyone who should drive or ride in his car and is thus 
protecting people other than himself. 
The federal standards issued by the Secretary of Commerce are different, for under 
them the burden is on the manufacturer, not the owner, to install safty belts. National 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1391-425 (Supp. II, 1967), and 
Initial Fed. Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 23 Fed. Reg. 2408, tit. 23, ch. II, part 255 
(1967). 
Congress has declared the scope of the federal standards. See National Traffic and 
Motor Vehicle Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. § 1391(1) (Supip. II 1967): 
Motor vehicle safety means the performance of motor vehicles or motor vehicle 
equipment in such a manner that the public is protected against unreasonable 
risk of accidents or injuries occurring as a result of the design, construction or per-
formance of motor vehicles. 
The standards, therefore, regulate the manufacturer in order to protect the public 
from unnecessary risks, and they do not directly rest1ict the individual owner's freedom. 
Thus, the federal seat belt standard would seem to meet no constitutional difficulties. 
Some argue that a duty of due care to wear the belts can be derived from the 
federal seat belt regulations. The argument runs that statutes requiring mere installa-
tion of seat belts impliedly require their use, and that any ruling to the contrary 
undermines any possible value inhering in legislation. There is a notable absence of 
legislative history supporting this contention. See Note, Seat Belt Legislation and 
Judicial Reaction, 42 ST. Jom,'s L. REv. 371 (1968). As to the argument that the 
regulations are meaningless unless construed to require use, an equally likely construc-
tion is that they are designed to encourage use. In this connection, see Note, Seat 
.Belt Negligence in Automobile Accidents, 1967 WIS. L. R.Ev. 288 (1967). 
61. See te.xt accompan)ing note 31 supra. 
